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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
any objection to personal jurisdiction by the execution of two
stipulations.
CPLR 302(a) (1).: Entering state to receive medical treatment
deemed a transaction of business.
Under CPLR 302 (a) (1), a nondomiciliary who transacts
business in New York subjects himself to personal jurisdiction
as to causes of action arising out of that transaction. 13 As 302 (a)
(1) is continuously applied to novel fact situations, light is shed
on its outer limits.
In Cohen v. Haberkorn,4 the appellate division, second de-
partment, recently held that a nondomiciliary who enters the
state to receive medical treatment "transacts business" under
302 (a) (1) and thus becomes amenable to personal jurisdiction
in an action by the physician to recover the value of his services.
CPLR 308(1).: Court of Appeals rules on redelivery problem.
The Court of Appeals has recently addressed itself to the
problem of whether a summons, originally delivered to an improper
person, is valid if through eventual redelivery it comes into the
possession of the party to be served. In McDonald v. Ames
Supply Co.,' the summons, seeking to secure jurisdiction over
defendant, a foreign corporation, was delivered to a building
receptionist who was not an employee of the defendant. The
receptionist subsequently delivered the summons to a proper party,
but the service was held invalid. (Had the receptionist been
an employee of the defendant, service would probably still have
failed since CPLR 311 provides that service upon a foreign
corporation be made by delivering the summons to "an officer,
director, managing or general agent, or cashier or assistant
casheir.")
The Court stated that generally, original personal delivery
to the wrong person constitutes improper service even though
the summons is shortly received by the correct person. 8 It pointed
out that any other rule would undermine the statutory pro-
cedure for setting aside a defectively served summons, since
the motion to set aside is itself evidentiary of eventual receipt
of the summons.
13See generally 7B McKiINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 104(1968).
1430 App. Div. 2d 530, 291 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1968).
1522 N.Y.2d 111 ....... N.E.2d ........ , 291 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968).
'
0 See, e.g., Clark v. Fifty Seventh Madison Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 693,
213 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't) appeal dismnissed, 10 N.Y.2d 808, 178 N.E.2d
225, 221 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Singer
Sewing Mach. Co., 281 App. Div. 867, 119 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1953).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
The Court, however, conceded that under the proper conditions
a redelivery might be sustained. It distinguished from the
instant case, situations where the process server acted reasonably,
and with due diligence, by placing the summons within the re-
calcitrant defendant's grasp or within his general vicinity.' 7 The
Court also indicated that cases upholding redelivery where it was
so close in time and space to the original delivery as to constitute
one act could still be sustained.""
The most doubtful cases were deemed to be those where
delivery is made to an improper person under a reasonable belief
that he is the proper person, and the proper person eventually
receives the summons. 19  The Court indicated that it regards due
diligence on the part of the process server to fulfill the statutory
mandate as the most important factor in sustaining or striking down
a redelivery case. Such an approach is realistic and at the same
time discourages sloppy service.
CPLR 309(a).: Judicial power to appoint a guardian ad litem.
In a recent case, Soto v. Soto,20 the appointment of a guardian
ad litem was vacated by the appellate division, first department,
since that appointment had been made prior to obtaining jurisdiction
over the infant defendant. However, in Matter of Beyer,- ,
a special proceeding under Article 77, the same court has held
that the power to appoint a guardian ad litem exists, upon ap-,
plication by the proper parties, when a proposed order to
show cause initiating a special proceeding is submitted to the
court. This apparent contradiction, may perhaps be clarified by
contrasting the prerequisites under the CPLR for the exercise
of judicial power in an action and the prerequisites in a special
proceeding.
CPLR 304 states that "ain action is commenced and jur-,
isdiction acquired by service of summons. A special proceeding
is commenced and jurisdiction acquired by service of a notice
of petition or order to show cause." In the instant case,
therefore, the court merely reasserted the necessity of proper
service of a summons as the primary step before the exercise
1'Sce, e.g., Buscher v. Ehrich, 12 App. Div. 2d 887, 209 N.Y.S.2d 941
(4th Dep't 1961); Chernick v. Rodriguez, 2 Misc. 2d 891, 150 N.Y.S.2d 149
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956).
IsSee Green v. Morningside Heights Housing Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124,
177 N.Y.S.2d 760, aff'd mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1st
Dep't 1958).
19See Marcy v. Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 237 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d
Dep't 1963). For a general discussion see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 308
supp. commentary 174 (1964).
2030 App. Div. 2d 651, 291 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dep't 1968).
2121 App. Div. 2d 152, 249 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964).
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